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NOTES
AUTHENTICATION OF DISPUTED WRITINGS BY
COMPARISON: THE EXPERT WITNESS
In many instances the authentication of writings offered in evidence
at a trial may be a purely formal matter; in others, it may be the pri-
mary issue in litigation. The latter is especially true in forgery and many
extortion prosecutions. Strongly contested issues of authentication also
may grow out of settlements of large estates where the genuineness of sig-
natures on wills are in dispute. Often deeds to land, which was originally
cheap but has greatly increased in value, must be defended against claims
of forgery; and a challenge of the genuineness of a signature on a note or
a check is a common defense.'
The generally accepted rule is that any document or writing purport-
ing to be of a certain authorship must be authenticated before it may be
admitted in evidence.2 In the ordinary case, where there is no dispute as
to genuineness, proof may not be necessary. A few documents are self
authenticating, 3 and the opponent may concede the document's authenticity
through a judicial admission.4 Counsel generally admit the genuineness of
proposed documents unless they have reason to doubt their authorship.5
Moreover, modern practice acts facilitate obtaining admissions. Under
many statutes, there is a judicial admission when the issue is not raised
by the pleadings or by affidavit denying the genuineness of a -writing.6 The
use of pre-trial may further encourage admissions, 7 and provisions which
under certain circumstances impose liability for the reasonable expenses of
proving matters as to which admissions were requested deter frivolous
denials of authenticity. 8
If put to proof of execution, the proponent of the writing may estab-
lish its authenticity by any of the generally accepted modes of direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. 9 He may propose a witness who is in one way or
another familiar with the handwriting of the alleged author who testifies
that, in his opinion, the writing is in the same hand as other writings the
1. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENT PROBLEMS 24, 25 (1944).
2. 7 WIGmo-E, EVIDENCE § 2130 (3d ed. 1940).
3. McCORMiCK, EVIDENCE § 186 (1954).
4. See 7 WIGMoRZ, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2132.
5. Interview with Henry Reath, Esq., Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 12, 1955.
6. 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2596.
7. See 1 MooRE, FEDFRAL PRACTICE 823-24 (1938); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 186
(1954).
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (c).
9. 7 WiMoRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2020.
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witness has seen.10 When there is a real dispute as to the genuineness or the
authorship of a writing, however, the mode of proof most often employed "
is the submission of genuine specimens of the alleged author's handwriting
to the trier of fact who may compare them with the writing on the dis-
puted document.'2 To aid the.trier of fact in this determination, witnesses
who are specially qualified in the science of handwriting are requested to
give their opinion by comparing in court the disputed document with the
genuine specimens of the alleged author's writing.
13
Proof of authorship by comparison of handwriting styles has a history
of strong judicial resistance. It was long established in English law by
the seventeenth century,14 but in that period it was unfairly and vindic-
tively used by the prosecutors employed by James II to bring about the
death of certain popular and heroic figures.'5 "Comparison of hands" thus
became associated with tyranny and oppression and was rejected in Eng-
land and in the American colonies largely on emotional grounds. 16 The
English corrected the situation by statute in 1854,17 and the American
states followed this example in quick succession.' 8 Today, "comparison of
hands" by the trier of fact and by expert witnesses is accepted in every
American jurisdiction.' 9 However, the opinion of the expert witness still
is held in low regard in many jurisdictions. 20 In light of the advancements
of the techniques of handwriting analysis, these attitudes would no longer
seem to be justified. Modern attempts to codify rules of evidence, such as
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, have not attempted to deal with the prob-
lem.21 This Note will examine the problems of authentication by compari-
son evidence.
WHO MAY COMPARE
Comparison of handwriting styles may be performed by a non-expert,
the trier of fact, or an expert. The trier of fact and the expert gain their
10. McCoRmIcK, EVIDNCZ § 189 (1954). For an illustration of how scanty this
familiarity need be, see In re Diggins' Estate, 68 Vt. 198, 34 AtI. 696 (1896), where
the witness was held to be qualified to give his opinion on genuineness even though he
had seen the writing of the alleged author once, twenty years before.
11. Interview with Leon Webster Melcher, Esq., Examiner of Questioned Writing
and Documents, Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 19, 1955.
12. McCoRMIcK, EviD4NCZ §§ 189, 172 (1954).
13. Id. § 172.
14. 3 CHAMBM AYNt, THE MODnRN LAW or EVIDxNC §§ 2214c, 2273 (1912).
15. 3 Id. § 2214b.
16. 3 Id. § 2214d.
17. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vicr. c. 125, § 27.
18. 3 CHAMBmLAYNX, op. cit. supra note 14, § 2214(d).
19. 7 WIG1oao, op. cit. supra note 2, §2016n.1; §2008n.1. Note however,
Georgia: Smith v. State, 77 Ga. 705 (1886), authorizes expert comparison. See also
GA. CODE ANN. §38-708 (1954). Rhode Island: 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. Moupra note 2,
§ 2008n.1 states "not allowed by the statute"--probably a typographical error (not
should be now) ; R.I. GEaN. LAWS c. 538, § 14 (1938). But see In re Astolas' Estate,
273 Mich. 189, 262 N.W. 766 (1935) (expert testimony inadmissible on issue of
genuineness of a signature made by mark).
20. See text at pp. 677-78 infra.
21. See UNIFORm RuLzs OF EVIDENCE rules 67-71.
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knowledge of the alleged author's handwriting by observing genuine speci-
mens which have been introduced into evidence and which they juxtapose
with the disputed writing in court.22 The non-expert may not so juxtapose
established standards since the jury is as qualified to do this as is he.2 3 The
non-expert testifies by comparing his memory of other writings of the al-
leged author with the disputed writing.24 Sometimes the non-expert may
be allowed to refresh his memory by being shown a genuine writing he has
seen before, but his testimony still is supposed to be from his memory.
25
The non-expert's testimony carries little weight,26 and it is easily dis-
credited. His opinion is based only on the general appearance of the writ-
ing2 7 since he ordinarily knows nothing about the science or mechanics of
handwriting. His memory of the writing previously seen is fallible and
generally inaccurate. Psychological experiments indicate that the details
of a mental image fade first and quite rapidly. It is the main outline or
schemata which is retained; the details are changed or omitted.28 As a
result, the non-expert may be discredited on cross examination by ques-
tions which he ordinarily will be unable to answer such as: "Does this writ-
ing you remember have a forward or backward slant?"; "Is the 'A' formed
by beginning the stroke at the top or bottom of the letter?"; "At what
angle is the 'T' crossed?" Testimony of genuineness by the non-expert
therefore generally carries less weight than comparison by juxtaposition of
the genuine specimen with the disputed writing by either the trier of fact
or a qualified expert.
In fact, the non-expert's testimony has been shown to be of compara-
tively little evidentiary value. An experiment on identification of handwrit-
ing indicates that non-experts attempting to identify genuine signatures on
the basis of their memory of the author's handwriting have a very low per-
centage (11 7) of accuracy. The same experiment indicates that compari-
son by means of juxtaposing the disputed writings with a set of genuine
specimens is more accurate. By means of this latter method, the non-ex-
perts employed in the experiment scored a significantly higher but still un-
satisfactory percentage (37%) of accuracy.
29
22. See Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N.W. 362 (1930);
Poole v. Beller, 104 W. Va. 547, 140 S.E. 534 (1927).
23. In re O'Connor's Estate, 101 Neb. 617, 164 N.W. 570 (1917).
24. See Hershberger v. Hershberger, 345 Pa. 439, 29 A.2d 95 (1942) ; In re Dig-
gins' Estate, 68 Vt. 198, 34 Atl. 696 (1896).
25. 7 WIGmomE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2007. Other exceptions to the rule forbidding
the non-expert to testify from genuine standards presented to him in court are: (1) A
non-expert who has seen the disputed document now lost but did not then know the
author of it may compare his memory of it with an established genuine standard. 7 Id.
§ 2005. (2) The possessor of ancient documents may compare them in court with the
disputed writing. 7 Id. § 2006.
26. See Roberts v. McCown, 288 Ky. 543, 156 S.W.2d 840 (1941) ; Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Webb, 281 Ky. 276, 135 S.W.2d 883 (1940).
27. Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting, 34 ILL. L. Rtv. 433, 442
n.15 (1939); BAKER, LAW ov DISPUTED AND FORGD DocUMENTS §22 (1955).
28. MUNN, PsycHoLoGy 207-08 (1951).
29. Inbau, supra note 27. For the purpose of testing identification from memory,
professors of the law faculty of Northwestern University and their secretaries at-
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Comparison by juxtaposition can be done only by the trier of fact or
by an expert witness since any conclusions drawn from comparison by the
ordinary witness would fall within the rule excluding opinion evidence. 30
For this reason, any witness who testifies on this basis must have special
skill, knowledge or experience in the field of handwriting so that his opin-
ion and his explanation of the reasons behind it will contribute something
in the search for truth over and beyond what the trier of fact could discern
for himself.31 Whether a witness is so qualified is a matter for the trial
court's discretion.
32
In most cases, a witness is accepted as an expert if he has an occupa-
tion which involves scrutinizing and accepting signatures or handwriting.
Bank employees, 33 registrars of deeds, 3 4 postmasters,35 and handwriting
teachers36 have been permitted to give their opinions based on comparison
in court. Ordinarily, these persons know little or nothing about scientific
handwriting analysis.3 7 They are not handwriting analysts with the train-
ing or experience of the professional document examiner. Even when they
admit their real lack of knowledge of the science of handwriting under cross-
examination, some courts still hold them competent to give their opinion.38
The other type of witness admitted as an expert is the handwriting
analyst. Through study and experience, such a witness is familiar with
the art and science of handwriting analysis. This is the study of the un-
conscious, automatic motion habits which form a person's handwriting
characteristics. 39  Handwriting has class characteristics and individual
tempted to identify the genuine signatures of the law professors in a set of four sig-
natures: a genuine specimen, a free-hand forgery, a tracing, and a spurious specimen
(one made without any attempt at imitation). For the purpose of testing identification
on the basis of comparing genuine standards with the unknown writings, a random
selection of lay persons were provided with the sets of four signatures, as above, plus
a set of six genuine specimens. The same experiment was performed with bank em-
ployees of several years' experience cashing checks or paying withdrawals from sav-
ings accounts. The ordinary lay persons had- an average accuracy of 37% while the
bank employees had an average accuracy of only 43%, a statistically insignificant dif-
ference.
30. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENcE § 172 (1954) ; 7 WiGmoRt, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1997.
The wisdom of this rule may be perceived from the results of the experiment described
in the preceding footnote-the ordinary lay person is no more accurate than the ordi-
nary juror and therefore can add nothing by his testimony.
31. MCCORMICK, EVIDXNC" § 13 (1954); Gavin v. Kniffen, 82 Colo. 448, 261 Pac.
6 (1927).
32. McColIuvcK, EVIDENCE § 13 (1954); 7 WIasORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2012.
See Simon v. Larson, 207 Minn. 605, 292 N.W. 270 (1940) ; O'Kelley v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 109, 14 S.E.2d 582 (1941).
33. Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 481, 154 N.E. 209, 214 (1926); Keeney v. Arp
De La Gardee, 212 Iowa 45, 47, 235 N.W. 745, 746 (1931) ; Adams v. Ristine, 138
Va. 273, 122 S.E. 126 (1924) ; Johnson v. Bee, 84 W. Va. 532, 100 S.E. 486 (1919).
34. Kornegay v. Kornegay, 117 N.C. 242, 23 S.E. 257 (1895).
35. State v. Parsons, 140 Kan. 157, 33 P.2d 1096 (1934).
36. First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Res. Bank, 295 Ill. App.
524, 15 N.E.2d 337 (1938).
37. See note 11 supra.
38. Fenias v. Reichenstein, 124 N.J.L. 196, 11 A.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Tower
v. Whip, 53 W. Va. 158, 44 S.E. 179 (1903).
39. Appel, Advances in Analysis of Questioned Documents, 38 Go. L.J. 385, 386
(1950).
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characteristics. Class characteristics result from the system of writing
which the writer employs while individual characteristics are a result of the
writer's muscular control, coordination, age, health, nervous temperament,
frequency of writing, personality and character.40 No two persons write
exactly alike,4 ' and no reproduction of a handwritten document can dupli-
cate completely all the details of the original writing.Y The professional
examiner is trained to detect these individual peculiarities. The micro-
scope 43 and camera 4 reveal minute details which escape the untrained and
unaided observation. Ultraviolet light may reveal erasures and eradica-
tions and makes possible reading what was originally written. 45 By chemi-
cal analysis of the ink or paper, it can be determined in many cases when
the writing was executed.46 Much of the expert's testimony is not actually
an opinion but a statement of physical facts which is accepted as direct
evidence.4 7 The expert's statement of his conclusion on the authorship is
accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons supporting it.48 He
generally illustrates his testimony with specially prepared enlarged photo-
graphs.49 For -these reasons, the truly qualified expert is an invaluable
witness in handwriting cases.
The experiment mentioned above 5 0 indicates that these persons have
an accuracy of 90 per cent. On the other hand, the same experiment showed
that bank employees and others commonly accepted as experts, absent the
special training just described, give opinions of little or no greater reliabil-
ity than any other non-expert such as the judge or members of the jury.51
Like any other non-expert, their opinions probably are based on the gen-
eral appearance of the writing.5 2 Their greater experience with writing
does not seem to increase the accuracy of their opinions. Perhaps the ex-
planation for this lies in the fact that their identification of the handwriting
is in a large part based on other considerations. For example, bank tellers
generally do not pay on a check on the basis of their examination of the
handwriting alone but also rely on their recognition or the general appear-
ance of the person presenting the check.
53
40. Hilton, The Detection of Forgery, 30 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 568 (1940).
41. BAXR, op. cit. supra note 27, §14.
42. Id. § 15; Hilton, supra note 40, at 599.
43. BAKMR, op. cit. supra note 27, §§ 24-29.
44. Id. §§ 30, 31.
45. Id. §§ 32-34; OSBORN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 159.
46. Appel, supra note 39, at 389-94.
47. See Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 483, 154 N.E. 209, 214 (1926); 3 CHAM-
BERLAYNE, op. cit. supra note 14, § 2224.
48. 7 WIGM R , op. cit. supra note 2, § 2014.
49. Howard v. Russel, 75 Tex. 171, 12 S.W. 525 (1889); Hancock v. Snider, 101
W. Va. 535, 133 S.E. 131 (1926).
50. See note 29 supra.
51. Inbau, supra note 27, at 439.
52. See note 27 mspra.
53. See Keeney v. Arp De La Gardee, 212 Iowa 45, 48, 235 N.W. 745, 746-47
(1931). Interview with John H. Stewart, Assistant Treasurer, First Pennsylvania
Bank, Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 19, 1955.
AUTHENTICATION OF WRITINGS
Perhaps the testimony of persons untrained in handwriting analysis
on the basis of comparison by juxtaposition should be excluded since the
jury is probably as competent as these witnesses in comparison.-4 Further-
more, the jury may be unduly influenced by the testimony of these wit-
nesses. This is especially true in smaller communities where the person
testifying, such as the local banker, is a well known and respected figure.
He is nearly always called in disputed document cases since his absence
may raise suspicions in the minds of the jury.55 When cross-examined,
the lack of expert qualification of these witnesses will be exposed to the
jury and will affect the weight of their testimony even though it may not
affect its admissibility.5 6 These alleged experts in handwriting generally
will be unable to recognize the system or to point out any of the charac-
teristics of the disputed writing and will be unfamiliar with the methodology
and terminology of the professional examiner.5 7 If there is also an expert
document examiner in the case, permitting bankers and other such wit-
nesses to testify probably will not affect the result. The testimony of the
handwriting analyst will generally be more convincing since he is able to
explain and illustrate the reasons behind his opinion.58 However, if funds
or inaccessibility prevent obtaining handwriting analysts, 9 substantial harm
may result regardless of the effectiveness of cross-examination since the
jury still may place undue weight on the opinion of these "experts" when,
in fact, their own opinion is substantially as reliable.
ADMISSIBILITY AND PROOF OF GENUINE SPECIMENS
As a basis for comparison, the handwriting style of the purported
author must be proved by introducing into evidence genuine specimens of
that handwriting as standards. It is apparent that the value of comparison
evidence depends heavily on the reliability of the specimens introduced as
standards. In order to form a valuable opinion, the handwriting of the
alleged author should 'be represented by an adequate number of genuine
specimens. Reflective of this is the fact that the careful professional docu-
ment examiner, when consulted for an opinion, often makes an indepen-
dent search for specimens in order to get as complete and fair a sampling of
the alleged author's handwriting as possible. 60 Specimens from such sources
as the pleadings, depositions, voters registration cards and income tax re-
54. In McCormick's opinion these "part-time" experts, as he calls them, (bank
cashiers, etc.) are much superior to the layman. No authority is cited nor any reason
given. MCCORMICK, EvInNcE § 172 (1954).
55. See note 11 supra.
56. Fenias v. Reichenstein, 124 N.J.L. 196, 11 A.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Tower v.
Whip, 53 W. Va. 158, 44 S.E. 179 (1903).
57. For suggestions on how to bring out these facts on cross-examination, see
OSBORN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 157-58.
58. See Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 483, 154 N.E. 209, 214 (1926) ; Murphy v.
Murphy, 146 Iowa 255, 262, 125 N.W. 191, 193 (1910) ; 7 WiGmORE, op. cit. supra note
2, § 2014.
59. See OsBoaN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 416-19 for a suggested solution.
60. See note 11 supra.
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turns help the expert guard against the possibility of his own client mis-
leading him with insufficient or inaccurate standards.6 '
The courts have recognized the necessity for adequate and reliable
specimens of the alleged author's handwriting. Today the rule in prac-
tically every jurisdiction, by statute or decision, is that any specimen which
is admitted 6 2 or proved 6 3 to be genuine to the satisfaction of the court is
admissible for purposes of comparison." The number of genuine speci-
mens is a matter of the trial judge's discretion. He must admit enough to
give a sufficiently wide basis for comparison,65 and he may restrict the in-
troduction of additional specimens as standards when the number already
in evidence is adequate.
66
For a long time, however, free admission of genuine specimens was
not permitted for two main reasons. The courts feared that a party could
mislead the jury by proposing an unfair selection of specimens, 67 and they
were concerned that the process of proving the genuineness of proposed
specimens would delay the trial and raise collateral issues which might
divert and confuse the jury.68 To minimize these dangers, some states
admitted only those specimens which were conceded by the opponent to be
genuine; 69 others limited the standards for comparison to those writings
already in the case for some other purpose; 70 while others admitted those
specimens which the judge had determined to be genuine.7 ' Although suc-
cessful in minimizing the problems aimed at, the first two rules were
arbitrary and unduly restrictive. 72 Today, the third rule has been adopted
in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions.7"
Unfair selection of specimens by one party still may be possible under
this majority rule even though the trial judge must admit enough to give
61. Ibid.
62. "Admitted" means a judicial admission. 7 WinmoRE, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 2021. There can also be an admission by silence in failing to object. In re Goldberg,
91 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1937); Mitchell v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Idaho 463, 234 Pac. 154
(1925) ; State v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa 6, 72 N.W. 497 (1897) ; Popalis v. Yanchura,
114 Pa. Super. 204, 173 At. 743 (1934).
63. See text at note 78 infra.
64. See BAKER, op. cit. supra note 20, § 69 for statutory comparison. The only
jurisdiction which limits specimens to those admitted or treated as genuine and does
not permit them to be proved genuine by other evidence is Oregon. ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 42.070 (1953), State v. Tice, 30 Ore. 457, 48 Pac. 367 (1897), State v. Branton, 49
Ore. 86, 87 Pac. 535 (1906).
65. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Suiter, 131 N.Y. 557, 29 N.E. 822 (1892).
66. Crane v. Dexter, Horton & Co., 5 Wash. 479, 32 Pac. 223 (1893). See Ky.
REv. STAT. § 422.120 (1953).
67. 7 WiG osn, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1999.
68. 7 Id. § 2000.
69. E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 42.070 (1953), State v. Tice, 30 Ore. 457, 48 Pac.
367 (1897) ; Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222 (1863).
70. E.g., Miles v. Loomis, 75 N.Y. 296 (1878).
71. See cases cited in note 73 infra.
72. 7 WiG om, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1999, 2000.
73. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 80 Me. 194, 13 Atl. 892 (1888); Costello v.
Crowell, 139 Mass. 588, 2 N.E. 698 (1885); Omohundro v. State, 172 Tenn. 48, 109
S.W.2d 1159 (1937), 15 TZNN. L. Rv. 25 (1938); Rowell v. Fuller's Estate, 59 Vt.
688, 10 Atl. 853 (1887).
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a wide basis for comparison.74 However, unfair selection is a possibility
in any case of proffered evidence, but this has never been considered a
ground for excluding testimony in any other instance.75 Furthermore, if
one party does present an incomplete or misleading set of standard speci-
mens, the opposing party may qualify the impression created by introducing
further specimens.
7 6
The problem of collateral issues is met, of course, by "vesting the judge
with the sole power to decide the preliminary fact of genuineness.7 7 The
standard of proof required is such clear and convincing evidence that the
judge may find the standard genuine as a matter of law.7 8 Ordinarily, any
direct or circumstantial evidence is admissible for this purpose,79 but the
genuineness of the specimens may not be proved by comparison with other
standards. 80 Some jurisdictions do not permit any opinion evidence for
this purpose,8' out of either a distrust of the reliability of such evidence 82 or
a desire to avoid further collateral issues.8 This is a sensible approach
since opinion evidence of non-experts is of the least probative value,84 and
the process of comparison by the trier of fact with the aid of expert testi-
mony, while highly reliable,85 inherently contains the possibility of com-
pounding errors of judgment.
In a few jurisdictions, the genuineness of a specimen in criminal cases
is decided only preliminarily by the judge.8 6 If he decides that the speci-
men is not genuine, he may exclude it; but if there is sufficient evidence of
its genuineness, he sends the issue to the jury. In these states, possible
74. See notes 64 and 65 supra.
75. See Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55 (1831); 7 WiGmo E, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1999; SFcoND RrPORT ov HPR MAMsTY's Co i ssiomms 25-26 (1853).
76. See note 65 supra.
77. See note 73 supra.
78. Wilson v. Scroggs, 85 Colo. 537, 277 Pac. 784 (1929) ; Brantley v. State, 84
Fla. 649, 94 So. 678 (1922) ; Cook v. Moecker, 217 Ill. App. 479 (1920) ; Sankey v.
Cook, 82 Iowa 125, 47 N.W. 1077 (1891); Clark v. Douglass, 5 App. Div. 547, 40
N.Y. Supp. 769 (3d Dep't 1896).
79. See People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 328, 61 N.E. 286, 307 (1901). As to ap-
plicability of the "return letter" doctrine, compare McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344
(1871), with Manning v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 180, 39 S.W. 118 (1897).
80. 7 WIGMoR.x, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2020.
81. By statute: Ky. Rim. STAT. § 422.120 (1953). By decision: State v. Wickett,
230 Iowa 1182, 300 N.W. 268 (1941); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76
N.E. 127 (1905) ; Fullam v. Rose, 181 Pa. 138, 37 AtI. 197 (1897) ; Eborn v. Zimple-
man, 47 Tex. 503 (1877). But see Whorton v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 1, 152 S.W. 1082
(1913).
82. Cf. Renner v. Thornburg, 111 Iowa 515, 82 N.W. 950 (1900).
83. Plymouth Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kassing, 72 Ind. App. 1, 125 N.E. 488 (1919).
84. See text at note 29 supra.
85. See text at note 50 supra.
86. Chisholm v. State, 204 Ala. 69, 85 So. 462 (1920) ; State v. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348,
74 Pac. 1114 (1904) ; Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127 (1905) ;
State v. Hastings, 53 N.H. 452 (1873); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E.
286 (1901).
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confusion to the jury is not considered to outweigh the defendant's consti-
tutional right to a trial by jury 7 or the desirability of the jury's traditional
role as the final arbiter of the facts.18
It is doubtful if vesting sole power in the judge to find the preliminary
fact of genuineness of a proposed standard denies the defendant his trial by
jury. The constitutional right is that a jury should decide the ultimate
question of his guilt or innocence. Whether it is the judge or the jury who
decides the preliminary questions of fact which arise in relation to the ad-
missibility of evidence is grounded in other considerations. 9 The gener-
ally accepted analysis is that preliminary questions of fact which determine
the competency of proposed evidence, for example, dying declarations, are
for the judge alone. Ordinarily, the jury would not be able to erase'the evi-
dence from their minds if they did not find it competent. Moreover,
the jury is generally more interested in reaching a verdict in accordance
with what they believe is true than in performing the intellectual gymnastic
of disregarding evidence for the sake of enforcing the long term policies of
evidence law.90 On the other hand, preliminary questions determining the
relevancy of the offered evidence may safely be left to the jury. The jury
understands relevancy and is willing to observe it since it goes only to pro-
bative pertinence.91 Whether the determination of the genuineness of pro-
posed specimens is a problem of the competency of the evidence or of its
relevancy is a close question. 92 It is unlikely that the jury would experi-
ence much difficulty in disregarding specimens they found not to be genu-
ine for purposes of their own comparison. On the other hand, it may prove
difficult to evaluate the expert's opinion if the jury must disregard some of
the specimens which were used by the expert in stating his opinion.
Moreover, the majority rule of leaving this question to the judge alone
has many advantages. It promotes simplicity in trial administration by
leaving the jury unencumbered with legal definitions and collateral ques-
tions. Since it is impossible to know what the jury decided after a general
verdict, rulings on the question by the judge alone simplify the problem of
arguing a motion for a new trial or an appeal. Presenting special ques-
tions to the jury may be effective in this regard, but this may impede
87. See People v. Molineux, supra note 86.
88. See Chisholm v. State, 204 Ala. 69, 85 So. 462 (1920); Commonwealth v.
Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127 (1905) ; State v. Hastings, 53 N.H. 452 (1873).
89. See Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L. Rv. 392 (1926) ; Morgan, Functions of Judge
and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HAav. L. Ruv. 165,
173 n.20, 187-89 (1929) ; McCormick, The Procedure of Admitting and Excluding Evi-
dence, 31 TFxAs L. REv. 128, 143-45 (1952) ; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. RV. 1281, 1285 (1952).
90. McCoRmICx, EvIDENCE § 53 (1954) ; McCormick, The Procedure of Admitting
and Excluding Evidence, 31 TEXAs L. REv. 128, 143 (1952).
91. Id. at 146.
92. Professor Morgan believes that the genuineness of standards for handwriting
comparison is a competency problem since the jury must be protected from undue con-
fusion and complication of issues and the defendant from unfair surprise. Morgan,
Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact,
43 HARv. L. Rzv. 165, 173 n. 20 (1929).
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rather than assist the jury in reaching a verdict. The jury may be able
to reach a general verdict by unanimous vote but may not be unanimous
on questions relating to it.9 3 Moreover, the timid or indolent judge may
accept this invitation to shirk his responsibilities and fail to scrutinize care-
fully the proposed specimens when the final determination rests with the
jury.,
Regardless of whether the specimen is genuine, it may not be admis-
sible on other grounds. A genuine specimen may be excluded if the con-
tent of the writing is inflammatory or prejudicial.95 Similarly, a reproduc-
tion of a genuine specimen may be rejected if there is insufficient proof of
its physical accuracy. Letter-press copies, now rare, were never competent
evidence of handwriting.9 6 Photolithic, 97 photostatic,98 and photographic99
copies are generally admitted after an affirmative showing of the exactness
of reproduction. Ordinarily, the testimony of the expert document exam-
iner that the reproductions were made under his supervision and in his
presence, and in his opinion are suitable, is a sufficient accounting for the
authenticity and scientific accuracy of the copy.10 The reproductions are
submitted to the jury with the caution that some of the dynamic character-
istics of the handwriting are lost in the process. 1 1
Another rule of exclusion is that writings made post litem motam, i.e.,
after the controversy arose, may not be proposed by their author ' 0 2 unless
they were executed in the ordinary course of business or under circum-
stances which negative all idea that they were made for the purpose of
being used as evidence in his favor. 0 3 Writings executed for the sole pur-
pose of creating standards are viewed with suspicion since a party should
not be allowed to manufacture evidence in his own favor.104 There is a
strong likelihood that the specimens will be executed by the party with in-
tent to confuse by intentionally disguising his handwriting.105
93. See Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. Rzv. 392 (1926).
94. Compare McCoRMIcK, EVID5Ncz § 112 (1954).
95. Gambrill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260, 52 Atl. 500 (1902) ; Hatch v. State, 6 Tex.
Crim. 384 (1879) ; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-15 (1953).
96. See Cohen v. Teller, 93 Pa. 123 (1880).
97. Geer v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 134 Mo. 85, 34 S.W. 1099 (1896).
98. Moncur v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 269 Pa. 213, 112 At. 476 (1921).
99. Howard v. Russel, 75 Tex. 171, 12 S.W. 525 (1889); Hancock v. Snider, 101
W. Va. 535, 133 S.E. 131 (1926).
100. Cf. Thomas v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 172 P.2d 973, 976 (Okla.
1946).
101. See note 98 supra.
102. By statute: Ky. Riv. STAT. § 422.120 (1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.900
(1938) ; N.J. Rv. STAT. §2A:82-1 (1951) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-15 (1953). By
decision: Travers v. Snyder, 38 Ill. App. 379 (1890) ; Johnson v. Crown Finance Corp.,
222 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App. 1949); Sanderson v. Osgood, 52 Vt 309, 312 (1880)
(dictum).
103. See note 102 supra; University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N.H. 163, 51 At!.
731 (1901) ; State v. Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316 (1877).
104. See BAIMR, op. cit. supra note 27, at 85-86.
105. Johnson v. Crown Finance Corp., 222 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo. App. 1949).
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Writings made post litem motam, although inadmissible in favor of the
party making them, are admissible against him.10 6 Accordingly, writings
made at the opponent's request may be introduced as standards.10 7 Usually
this request is made' 08 and the opponent must ordinarily execute the re-
quested specimens.10 9 To obtain reliable standards by this method, a num-
ber of signatures should be written under observation to prevent any at-
tempt by the writer to disguise his style. The best standards can be ob-
tained if the signatures are executed on similar paper, on separate sheets
in the same location on the sheet, and with the same implement as the dis-
puted signature." 0 Although the witness may attempt to disguise his
hand, this can be detected by comparison with other genuine specimens so
that the witness' effort will only result in discrediting his own general cred-
ibility.
Thus far the discussion of the admissibility of specimens has centered
on their reliability and general competency. A separate issue of admissibil-
ity arises in a few jurisdictions. Although specimens are ordinarily offered
to prove that the disputed document was or was not written by the pur-
ported author, in many cases, it may be desirable to prove in addition to
this that the writing was executed by some other specific person. Most
jurisdictions do permit the introduction of an alleged forger's handwriting
to prove that he rather than the purported author actually executed the
writing in question."' In the few jurisdictions which do not permit this,"
2
judicial resistance to comparison evidence in general is high. The decisions
excluding specimens offered for this purpose are based either on an overly
narrow reading of the statute permitting comparison evidenceai 3 or on the
ground that collateral questions are introduced." 4  Since proof that some
other specific person executed the writing in question is convincing proof
of the fact that the purported author did not execute the writing, it is doubt-
ful that proof of actual authorship should be considered collateral to the
106. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
107. Allen v. Gardner, 47 Kan. 337, 27 Pac. 982 (1891) ; Sprouse v. Common-
wealth, 81 Va. 374 (1886).
108. See note 11 supra.
109. A witness may be upheld in refusing to write when requested if the disputed
writing was executed before his handwriting style matured, Williams v. Riches, 77
Wis. 569, 46 N.W. 817 (1890), or if he asserts his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 333, 61 N.E. 286, 309 (1901) ; Beltran v. Sam-
son, 53 Phil. 570 (1929) ; 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2264. However, if the de-
fendant in a criminal case takes the stand in his own defense, he may be compelled to
write. Hall v. State, 171 Ark. 787, 286 S.W. 1026 (1926) ; Bradford v. People, 22 Colo.
157, 43 Pac. 1013 (1896).
110. Hilton, Procuring Handwriting Specimens During Cross-Examination, 28
CONN. B.J. 168 (1954).
111. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. State, 49 Fla. 137, 38 So. 3 (1905) ; People v. Truck,
170 N.Y. 264, 63 N.E. 281 (1902); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286
(1901).
112. Strong v. Abner, 268 Ky. 502, 105 S.W.2d 599 (1937); Johnson v. Crown
Finance Corp., 222 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App. 1949) ; Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 150,
16 S.W. 557 (1890) ; cf. Coppock v. Lampkin, 114 Iowa 664, 87 N.W. 665 (1901).
113. Strong v. Abner, supra note 112.
114. Johnson v. Crown Finance Corp., 222 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App. 1949).
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issue of authentication. When a New York court excluded specimens of-
fered for this purpose," 5 the result was changed by statute." 6
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Counsel trying a case in which comparison evidence is introduced must
carefully weigh the strategy he will use in cross-examination. It is an im-
portant tactical decision whether to cross-examine the highly skilled ana-
lyst at all."1 Since he is likely to know more about the technical mat-
ter involved than the lawyer, inquiries into the basis of his opinion may
strengthen the witness' testimony rather than weaken it.11 8 However, the
qualifications of the alleged expert such as the banker or postmaster may
well be explored, at least to help the trier of fact to evaluate his opinion,
even if his testimony cannot thereby be stricken from the record." 9 The
qualifications of the analyst may also be questioned if the cross-examiner
has advance information on the subject0 20 The analyst's testimony might
be weakened by questions which reveal that he has not kept abreast of new
techniques of analysis or has had little experience with an unusual problem
presented by the document in dispute.
121
If it is decided not to question the expert's qualifications or his opin-
ion directly, several avenues are open to the examiner. First of all, it is an
accepted and generally permitted practice to attempt to impeach the wit-
ness by questioning him as to his fees or charges. 2 2 If the fee is excessive
or contingent on the outcome of the litigation, a strong suggestion of bias
may be raised. 23 Another available means of impeachment is to question
the expert about a mistake made in a former trial. The cases disagree on
the permissibility of this line of questioning,124 and the relevancy of such
an inquiry is doubtful. A mistake in an opinion given in a prior unrelated
case does not really affect the value of the expert's present opinion since
its persuasiveness depends on the soundness of the reasons supporting it.
Moreover, the question seems likely to confuse the jury by presenting the
collateral issue of whether the expert was mistaken.
There are two other generally practiced modes of testing the expert's
opinion. The first method is to show the same specimen to several wit-
115. Peck v. Callaghan, 95 N.Y. 73 (1884).
116. N.Y. STAT. 1888, c. 555 as cited in 7 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 2016
n.1; People v. Murphy, 135 N.Y. 453, 32 N.E. 138 (1892).
117. See CORNELIUS, CROSS-EXAMINATION o WITNXSsxs 246-56 (1929).
118. OSBORN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 154.
119. See text at note 38 supra.
120. See. note 11 supra.
121. See Keys v. Keys, 23 Tenn. App. 188, 129 S.W.2d 1103 (1939).
122. See Butman v. Christy, 197 Iowa 661, 198 N.W. 314 (1924).
123. OSBORN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 219-20. Furthermore, it is not ethical for a
lawyer to pay a contingent fee to a witness. DRINxam, LGAL E~T1Ics 86 (1953).
124. Compare Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579 (1903) (permitted to
ask expert about mistake at former trial), with In re Gunerson's Estate, 174 Wash.
462, 24 P.2d 1070 (1933) (not permitted).
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nesses in the hope that they will give conflicting opinions. 125 In the use
of this technique it is not necessary to establish the genuineness of the speci-
men used since its effect lies in showing disagreement among the experts.
The second method, which does require special collateral proof of genuine-
ness, is to show the witness a writing which is a provable forgery in the
hope that he will declare it to be genuine' 2 6 There are many variations
on this method. For example, counsel may write his own name both right-
handed and left-handed and then ask the witness either to tell whether they
were written by the same person or to tell which is written left-handed. An-
other often employed variation is to mingle genuine and spurious specimens
and ask the expert to declare which are the genuine writings.
27
These varied uses of spurious specimens may effectively discredit the
expert's opinion, but many courts do not permit his opinion to be tested in
this way. In some states this technique is barred on the ground that the
statute permitting comparison by expert witnesses specifies that only speci-
mens admitted or proved to be genuine may be used. 28 In other jurisdic-
tions, the use of spurious writings on cross-examination is prohibited for
any or all of the following reasons: collateral questions of proving the for-
geries are introduced; the issues are multiplied; the minds of the jury are
diverted; the jury may be confused; and the witness is put to an unfair
disadvantage. 2 9 For similar reasons, some courts do not permit the use of
specimens not already in evidence. 130
Prohibiting the use of spurious specimens on the basis of statutory
construction is an unfortunate result, since the statutes were enacted to
overcome previous judicial restrictions on the use of specimens for com-
parison purposes.1 3 ' The contentions that the trial is impeded and the jury
may be confused by collateral issues are not serious objections. These were
first advanced to limit the introduction of specimens for comparison pur-
poses to those already in the case or to those admitted to be genuine.132 To
the extent that these limitations were imposed to prevent confusing the
jury, the reasons behind them have lost their validity under the rule per-
mitting proof of genuineness to the judge alone. 3 3 The trial will not be
impeded since the false specimens used on cross-examination ordinarily
are prepared during the trial so that the one who made them is readily
125. 7 WiGmoRE, op. cit. mtpra note 2, § 2015.
126. Ibid.
127. Browning v. Gosnell, 91 Iowa 448, 456, 59 N.W. 340, 343 (1894) ; Hoag v.
Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579 (1903).
128. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. McArthur, 168 N.C. 48, 84 S.E. 39 (1915); Wilmington
Say. Bank v. Waste, 76 Vt. 331, 57 Atl. 241 (1904).
129. See McArthur v. Citizens' Bank, 223 Fed. 1104 (4th Cir. 1915); Underwood
v. Quantic, 85 Kan. 111, 116 Pac. 36 (1911); Fourth Nat'l Bank v. McArthur, .mpra
note 128.
130. Rose v. First Nat'l Bank, 91 Mo. 401, 3 S.W. 876 (1886); Mitchell v. First
Nat'1 Bank, 40 Idaho 463, 467, 234 Pac. 154, 156 (1925) (dictum).
131. See text at notes 69-71 supra.
132. See text at note 68 supra.
133. See text at notes 71, 73 supra.
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available to prove their character. 134 Confessedly, this technique may take
unfair advantage of the witness, but protecting him from impeachment by
this method would not seem to be a relevant consideration. If necessary,
the case might be continued to enable the witness to analyze the specimen.
Actually, a cautious and skilled expert will not hazard an opinion on speci-
mens which he sees for the first time.135 The essence of his approach is a
slow, careful analysis employing the camera, microscope, ultraviolet light
and the other resources of the modern laboratory.13 6 The expert witness
who will give his opinion without this searching examination should be ex-
posed since this may be indicative of the value of his prior testimony on the
disputed document.
Restricting the use of spurious signatures is a serious loss to both the
cross-examiner and the court seeking the truth.13 7 Cross-examination has
long been regarded as an important safeguard of the accuracy and complete-
ness of testimony.13 The cross-examiner should be permitted to use any
device within his ingenuity and the bounds of propriety to expose the ex-
pert who is careless and inept enough to hazard opinions on insufficient
investigation. "It is better to take a little time to see whether the opinion
of the witness is worth anything, rather than to hazard life, liberty or prop-
erty upon an opinion that is worth nothing." 139
WEIGHT OF THE EXPERT'S TESTIMONY
There is no uniformity in the attitude of the various jurisdictions to-
ward the weight to be attached to expert handwriting testimony, and the
decisions seem to make no distinction between the handwriting analyst and
the questionable "expert" such as the banker or postmaster. 140 In some
jurisdictions it is still considered proper to disparage expert testimony in
the charge to the jury by telling them that it is "unsafe" 141 or "most un-
satisfactory." 142 A neutral position is observed in other courts where it
is said that the weight to be attached to the expert's testimony is "for the
jury," 143 or it is fairly pointed out that the weight of opinion testimony
depends largely on the character of the witness, his opportunity for acquir-
ing knowledge of the handwriting and the cogency of the reasons for his
134. See 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2015, at 210.
135. See note 11 supra.
136. See pp. 667-68 supra.
137. See note 115 supra.
138. McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCM § 19 (1954).
139. Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 44, 66 N.E. 579, 581 (1903).
140. See Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 154 N.E. 209 (1926) ; Keeney v. Arp De
La Gardee, 212 Iowa 45, 235 N.W. 745 (1931).
141. Polley v. Cline's Ex'r, 263 Ky. 659, 93 S.W.2d 363 (1936); D'Angelo v.
Nicolosi, 197 La. 797, 2 So. 2d 216 (1941).
142. Butman v. Christy, 197 Iowa 661, 198 N.W. 314 (1924); Fourth Nat'l Bank
v. McArthur, 168 N.C. 48, 84 S.E. 39 (1915) ; cf. Keeney v. Arp De La Gardee, 212
Iowa 45, 235 N.W. 745 (1931).
143. Rosenthal v. Citizens State Bank, 266 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1954); In re Mc-
Carthy's Estate, 265 Wis. 548, 61 N.W.2d 819 (1954).
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opinions. 44 In one jurisdiction, it has been held that it is never proper to
instruct the jury that expert testimony is or is not reliable, or as to how
the jury should appraise it.145 It has been held reversible error to disregard
an expert's testimony.146 In Pennsylvania, the rule is that testimony of
expert witnesses alone cannot support a finding of forgery. 47 In others,
findings of genuineness based on comparison with the aid of expert testi-
mony have been sustained.148 Some courts hold that the positive testimony
of unimpeached attesting witnesses is not outweighed by, and is more con-
vincing than, the testimony of handwriting experts.149
Some of the attitudes antagonistic to expert testimony may be attrib-
uted to an historical distrust of comparison testimony in general' 50 Others
represent fears of possible bias on the part of the expert witness in that he
may be too willing to give an opinion in accordance with the necessities of
his employer's position.15' Regardless of its basis, these attitudes would
seem to be justified in the case of the "expert" who is untrained in hand-
writing analysis since it is doubtful if such a witness is able to aid the trier
of fact. However, in view of the progress which has been made in the
technique of scientific handwriting analysis, disparaging instructions or
reversals based on a deprecating view of the weight of expert testimony are
out of place in the case of the handwriting analyst. To hold the opinions
of persons who testify from their memory generally superior to the opinions
of a handwriting analyst on the basis of a possible bias of experts is un-
realistic and unfair. These persons may be equally subject to bias, bias
may be exposed by cross-examination, and the relative superiority of expert
opinion has been demonstrated. 152 Since the handwriting analyst may be
in error, the direct evidence of a purported eye-witness should be given ap-
propriate weight. However, it is doubtful if the jury should be instructed
to give greater weight to the purported witness' testimony than to the
expert's opinion since many false claims have been based on definite and
positive perjury. 5 3 In any case, it is evident that the weight to be given
the testimony of the expert witness on the basis of comparison by juxta-
position should be carefully reconsidered in many jurisdictions. There is
little doubt that the opinion evidence of the witness trained in handwriting
analysis is of great value and should be given greater weight than many
courts have allowed it.
144. Kucaba v. Kucaba, 146 Neb. 116, 18 N.W.2d 645 (1945).
145. Hirshfeld v. Dana. 193 Cal. 142, 223 Pac. 451 (1924).
146. Nolan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 326 Ill. App. 328, 61 N.E.2d 876 (1945).
147. Dworken v. McElwee, 355 Pa. 37, 48 A.2d 566 (1946).
148. In re Kreher's Estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d 831, 238 P.2d 150 (1951) ; Gaines v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., 191 Okla. 246, 129 P.2d 79 (1942) (semIble).
149. Baird v. Shaffer, 101 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836 (1917); Wright v. Flynn, 69
N.J. Eq. 753, 61 Atl. 973 (Prerog. Ct. 1905) ; In re Henry's Estate, 276 Pa. 511, 120
Atl. 454 (1923).
150. See text at note 16 supra.
151. See Polley v. Cline's Ex'r, 263 Ky. 659, 675, 93 S.W.2d 363, 371 (1936).
152. See text at notes 50 and 52 supra.
153. OSBORN, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 57-58.
